Thursday, December 03, 2009

The NotMakingThisUp Interview with Alice Schroeder


Editor’s Note:
We had the opportunity to interview author Alice Schroeder as the paperbook version of her best-selling, and eye-opening, "The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life" was hitting stores. We emailed more than a dozen questions to Alice, including a few that might have been uncomfortable, but, we thought, worthwhile. Alice answered them all.
Our questions are in plain typeface; Ms. Schroeder’s responses are italicized in bold.
For her thoughts on brilliant people, costly aspirations and codependency, as well as working against actuarial tables, sources fearing retaliation and when “he stopped speaking to me,” not to mention the next CEO’s biggest challenge, Charlie’s dictionary entry, “a major case of monkey mind” and other unique insights into Warren Buffett and the future of Berkshire Hathaway, read on!


JM: First of all, Alice, congratulations on having written a book—that isn’t easy. Second, congratulations on the book being successful enough to warrant a paperback—that isn’t as common as it used to be.

AS: Thank you very much. And congratulations on your very successful book.

JM: Thanks. What was the worst part—not the hardest, but the worst—about writing the book in the first place?

AS: Wow, we are really launching right in here. Okay, the worst part was living with fear. Nearly all writers live with a fear of being judged that increases as the book draws closer to its publication date. I did live with that fear, yet it was far outweighed by my fear of the consequences of publishing this book. I wrestled with that daily for years.

Eventually, I could judge the truth of my writing by my feelings. If it made me feel weak, even nauseous to write something, that was good. It meant that I’d succeeded in subduing the fear monster with my blow dart just long enough to pen it on the page.

I never reread The Snowball if I can help it. The fear monster glares at me from its captivity inside the book. Better to just shut the covers and leave it there.


JM: Understood. What was the best part of writing “The Snowball”?

AS: There’s no one best part. You can’t imagine how grateful I feel to have had this opportunity. I have never learned so much about so many topics so fast. Warren is a great teacher. Simply by observing him and his world you absorb a whole new culture, as an anthropologist would. I got to spend time with a whole cast of other interesting, brilliant people. Imagine being able to talk to Bill Gates for hours. He’s a great teacher, too.

I researched all sorts of unusual topics that would never have crossed my desk otherwise. The history of desegregation in Washington, D.C. How a slaughterhouse was organized in 1940s Omaha. The history of Las Vegas.

I learned to write narrative nonfiction. Some days the words well up inside you and you know they are coming from somewhere outside yourself. To experience that sense of grace is why writers write. This experience changed my life in so many ways that I can’t recount them in a paragraph.


JM: So what, if anything, did you regret about the book once it was published?

AS: According to both my agent and editor, every writer sees the flaws in their book, real and imagined, as soon as they open the covers. And it’s true.

JM: You bet. Now, the new, paperback version of “Snowball” is shorter, but I honestly couldn’t identify major chunks that you removed—and that is no easy feat. What did you remove and who decided what to take out?

AS: I did the cutting myself, which was essential, and removed words, phrases, and sentences to condense stories when possible rather than wholesale cutting. I had to make some tough decisions. One story that was hard to cut, for example, was the story of Warren’s silver investment in the chapter “Semicolon.” He had bought almost a third of the world’s silver supply. He wanted to go to London to visit the silver, and pictured himself in the vault, enjoying the feeling of being surrounded by all those silver bars. What an image.

JM: Yes it is. Now, a question about the title. Not about “The Snowball” part, which some Buffettologists thought was odd given that the snowball metaphor is one of his least well known—but about the “Warren Buffett and the Business of Life” part.

As your book points out, his wife left him—physically, at least—after 25 years, and his children, in their formative years, appear to have occupied his mind less than 10-Ks and 10-Qs.

Indeed, subheadings in your book’s index under “Warren Buffett” include, and I am not making this up, ‘attention-seeking,’ ‘emotional frugality,’ and ‘focus, total absorption and obsession.’

Isn’t one subtext of your book that WB failed where it really matters in the “business of life?”

AS: We read biographies of eminent subjects to learn from their lives, for better or worse. These are people who have succeeded and failed on a grand scale, and the lessons they impart are magnified accordingly. Warren’s life is so instructive – the Inner Scorecard, his way of dealing with people, how he taught himself to think about risk, about time, about responsibility. When I started working on the book it felt like getting a post-graduate degree in life. I wanted to give those lessons to the reader.

As for the business of life in the title, the point is that business is inseparable from life. Most of the investing books focus on financial success as an isolated goal. Yet his business life can’t be understood outside the context of his personal life. Warren’s story is a living illustration that aspirations to be as successful as him have a cost. Until I got to observe him closely I didn’t realize how single-minded he is. People who want to invest like Warren Buffett ought to understand what this would mean to their lives.

Lastly, readers might be interested to know that a professional indexer creates the index. This is a real job – indexer -- I am not making this up. Other terms she chose: complex personality, honesty, sense of rectitude, sentimentality, showmanship, personal growth after Susie’s death.


JM: You interviewed a lot of people for your book. First, what was your relationship with Susan T. Buffett, and how comfortable were you interviewing her?

AS: I met Susie the day I first interviewed Warren as an analyst. The first five years we barely knew each other. It wasn’t until the book got going that we started getting acquainted. Susie’s very comfortable to be around. One time she took me down to Glide Memorial Church to see the gospel choir rehearse, and we had dinner with the Reverend Cecil Williams and his wife, Janice Mirikitani. I’ve had a couple of meals with Susie, and her eating habits were nearly as appalling as Warren’s, incidentally.

As you would expect from reading The Snowball, when I was interviewing Susie, she didn’t want to talk about herself, but was forthcoming about Warren. She was diagnosed with cancer six months after I started working on the project, which limited the interviews we were able to do. That was too bad. She was a wise woman.

JM: Who was most fun to interview?

AS: Warren, of course. He’s nonstop funny as well as always teaching you things. Among the rest, my favorites, hands down, were the older people. The actuarial tables were not working in my favor, with so many people of Warren’s generation and older to interview, so I started with the oldest first – those over age ninety – and worked my way down. We so rarely spend generous amounts of time with our elders. I was able to do it often and at length. It was a privilege to spend so many hours among people who had accumulated such a great store of wisdom.

JM: Who gave you the most insightful view of Buffett?

AS: Warren, by letting me spend so much time observing him and talking to him. My observations of him became the litmus test against which I measured everyone else’s statements. Beyond that, his sisters, Doris and Bertie, who have known him longer than anyone. Charlie Munger. His kids. Sharon Osberg. Don Graham. A few others that I’d prefer not to name.

JM: Speaking of those last, in your acknowledgements you cite “those who asked not to be named”: what, in general, did those who didn’t want to be named have in common?

AS: They wanted the truth to be told, and were afraid of retaliation if they were named.

JM: Wow. Okay. One final question along this line: there’s a quote late in the book (Page 694 in the paperback), about how Buffett held off on endorsing Obama “until it became irrelevant.” You write:

As one observer put it, “Warren only ever wants to back winners. Your real friends are the people who are there for you even though it might cost them something.”

That sounds remarkably catty for a true friend of Buffett to say. Buffett is a guy who won’t sell the Buffalo News even knowing its value is going to zero and who almost never fires a CEO, even if the business is underperforming. I suspect it was said by a political acquaintance. Am I wrong about that, and do you agree “he only ever wants to back winners”?

AS: To help and endorse and support your friends when they are in need is different than making business decisions about underperforming assets and people. The quote you refer to came from a close friend of his who has no involvement in politics, and is simply one of the people who have been hurt. I would describe it as a wounded, not catty statement.
Remember, we’re speaking of the man who wouldn’t help his sister when she nearly went bankrupt, who wouldn’t help his daughter when she was pregnant (and they are not the sources of this quote).

By the way, as you can tell from The Snowball, people who’ve been hurt by Warren almost always rise above it, and still love him in the end.

JM: You became the major first sell-side analyst (we call them “Wall Street’s Finest” here—no offense, I hope) to cover Berkshire Hathaway after Buffett merged with Gen Re. You gained enough of Buffett’s respect that he regularly appeared at your famous (among Buffettologists) Friday night dinner in Omaha during the annual meetings, and ultimately gave you his blessing to write what was perceived to be his one and only authorized biography.

How did your own personal view of Buffett change from the first time you ever met him to the day “Snowball” was published—and how about as of today?

AS: If I could make one small adjustment to your introduction, Warren cooperated with me for The Snowball, but it was not an authorized biography. The latter means the subject has editorial control over the book.

When I knew Warren as an analyst he was an awe-inspiring, almost infallible-seeming figure. Fortunately he didn’t care about the stock’s rating, and I believe he might even have been perversely pleased had I put a sell rating on it, so that he could show off how little he cared and make a point about Wall Street. (I didn’t, and it would have been a mistake to do that during the time I followed BRK).


Once I got to know him better he became real, fallible, even fragile. His achievements actually seem more impressive to me with hindsight. To start out in life with a family like his and accomplish what he has done is, in my opinion, a greater feat than the public generally gives him credit for. Whereas the hero-worship of Warren Buffett has been overdone, his real accomplishments are underappreciated.

Today, he seems the same person as when I finished the book. The test of whether you’ve done good research is how well you can predict and, more important, explain your subject’s behavior. Warren rarely surprises me, and I nearly always understand his motives.


JM: You wrote extensively—I'd guess too extensively for most Buffettologists, not to mention for Buffett himself, if the rumors are true—of his personal life. In fact, you named his first wife’s lover. Having been a Wall Street analyst and having written a book about Warren Buffett, I know it is not easy to write something unflattering about a person you both like and admire.

How hard was it to physically put those words down in a book that would be read by WB, not to mention his best friends and family?

Also, where did the worst reaction come from, and do you think you could have or should have done anything differently?

AS: It’s strange that this is a controversy. A biography includes the details of the personal relationships that influenced the breakdown of the subject’s marriage. That goes without saying. You can’t really understand Warren Buffett without this information.

And of course I didn’t want to hurt Warren. I care about him as a human being. It was hard to know that he was going to be hurt and that I would be the instrument of his pain. But let us turn this around a bit.

Warren knew my work as an analyst. He knew that I was dogged about research and that I had a history of writing things that were true even if they upset people. He chose me for this project anyway. He may have thought, who knows what. That in exchange for such complete cooperation, I would owe him the loyalty of writing the version he wanted. As many people would. Nonetheless, he knew what he was getting when he chose me. That was not an accident.
He immediately began shoveling biographical material of an intensely personal nature at me. Until that point I had no idea of the situation I was walking into. Once I started to understand, it became my responsibility to do corroborative research. The choice was to tell the truth, which would hurt Warren, anger other people, and expose me to vindictiveness, or to lie, which would violate the reader’s trust and my integrity. I had to work myself up over and over to find the courage to tell the truth.

From time to time, I talked to Warren, and my agent talked to Warren, to let him know that he wasn’t going to like, or even necessarily agree with, some aspects of the book. He continued to cooperate with me throughout. Warren read the book in July 2008, right before it went to the printer.
Afterwards, we continued to have a perfectly friendly relationship, right up until the week The Snowball was published. It was only then that he stopped speaking to me. Under the circumstances, someone might deduce that other people’s reactions influenced him, although there’s no way to know for sure.

I wouldn’t do anything differently with hindsight. This was an important book that needed to be written. I made a considered judgment based on the readers’ needs, and have tried to set my own feelings aside.

JM: The results speak for themselves, I’d say. Now, moving beyond the personal, while researching “Pilgrimage to Warren Buffett’s Omaha,” my thought process on Berkshire changed: I went in thinking Buffett the Investor could be replaced by an equally rational investor, while Buffett the Manager could be replaced by anyone who merely left the Berkshire companies alone.

However, I came out thinking Buffett the Investor may not need to be replaced—because the investment portfolio is so minor relative to the businesses Berkshire now owns—while Buffett the Manager can’t be replaced for the simple reason that nearly all those Berkshire companies are run by individuals who sold to Warren Buffett, not to Howard Buffett and the Board of Directors. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that families who might want to sell to Warren Buffett would feel comfortable selling to a David Sokol on anything like the terms Buffett would get.

What's your take?
.
AS: Allocating Berkshire’s capital (as opposed to investing in stocks) is going to be the CEO’s biggest challenge. The Berkshire companies throw off a lot of cash. Even after the company declares a dividend, as it almost certainly will, there is still the capital management question.

Warren has a term, the Institutional Imperative, to describe the empire-building and other foolishness that leads to overpriced acquisitions, underutilized capital, stock repurchased above its intrinsic value, stock issued below its intrinsic value, and all the other failures of capital management that companies are so prone to commit. CEOs are rewarded in all sorts of ways for creating bigger companies, not more profitable companies. That’s putting aside all the risk that goes with running a big insurance business and the other financial exposures that Berkshire’s balance sheet includes. Then there is the Buffett charm you describe, which has brought the company such good acquisition opportunities. How do you replace that? Capital management is the biggest risk shareholders face.

Warren’s not replaceable as a manager, in my opinion, because he’s created a company that’s an expression of his personality. Even so, Berkshire can evolve to become a more conventional yet still successful company without losing its essence if Warren’s successor does a good job.

I am not in the camp that believes it must be broken up. That’s conceivable, but not necessary. The most critical issue is choosing good operating managers. Undoubtedly many of those who are running the businesses now will retire when Warren leaves. They have hand-picked their successors without much, if any, oversight from Warren. The next CEO will need to approach the turnover as an opportunity, not a problem, if he wants to succeed. It is, for example, an opportunity to improve diversity in Berkshire’s leadership.

JM: Good points, all. Now, you are not a Berkshire shareholder: why?
AS: I thought it would be a conflict of interest to own BRK while writing the book, and didn’t want to have to deal with that. Plenty of people who write about him do own the stock, which I’m not criticizing. Whether someone can manage a conflict of interest is purely a personal thing. But you can also see, collectively, how it influences the gestalt. The tone of writing on Buffett as a whole is largely set by the way so many authors are financially invested in him. If all these people have gotten rich or are getting rich or hope to get rich because of Warren Buffett, how objective can they be?

Journalists and analysts disclose whether they own a stock, but interestingly, they aren’t ever asked to disclose whether the investment is material to their net worth. After the book was published and I’d said my piece, I did buy some BRK. It’s not significant to my net worth.

JM: I meet an inordinate number of people who have personally met Buffett and/or Munger in one way or another—finance (Buffett), real estate (Munger), charity (Munger), and education (Munger also)—and I've heard some great stories.

You must hear things all the time: what’s a favorite story, or a favorite interaction of your own with them, that you didn’t include in the book?

AS: Warren is not so good with anything visual. Once we were talking on the phone after I had known him for years and he had seen me on many occasions. As a sort of joke, I asked him what color my hair was. He paused for quite a long time, and then said, “Not black.”

JM: Perfect. Of course, Charlie Munger is as important to the Berkshire model as Buffett himself. My own feeling is that Munger has had a better rounded life than Buffett—and yet he comes across to strangers as impossibly arrogant.

What's your take on Charlie?

AS: It’s hard to sum up Charlie in a couple of sentences or a paragraph. He’s quite humble in his genuine respect for the achievements of others, as long as they equal or exceed his own intelligence, in his opinion. He is so ungodly judgmental that some people find him insufferable, yet his fundamental kindness shines through. Politically … if you look up “politically incorrect” in the dictionary you’ll find a picture of Charlie there instead of a definition. That’s part of why Charlie is refreshing to be around, though. He’s always himself. There is not a phony cell in his body.

Your time will not be wasted talking to Charlie. Usually he’s got something very interesting and insightful to say. It’s better to listen when you’re around Charlie than to try to talk. The phenomenon I wrote about in the book, about him turning his head off when other people are talking, is very much in evidence at times. He’s really a treasure. I enjoyed interviewing Charlie immensely.


JM: I bet. Now, back to Warren.
There’s a single sentence in your book (page 650) that blew my mind. It puts Buffett in focus like nothing else I’ve read, but I’m not sure if you meant it the way it’s written. The setting is this: Susan T. Buffett, his first wife, has had a brain hemorrhage in Sun Valley; Buffett is distraught and at her side in the hospital; their two younger children have traveled a long distance to get there; and when they arrive at the hospital, you quote Buffett telling them nothing about their mother, her condition, or what exactly happened. You have him saying, "I've been here 5 hours."

Is it really all about him?

AS: Well, I guess the best way to answer that is to say that a trained psychologist or psychotherapist would have a field day reading The Snowball. I’m not qualified to diagnose psychological conditions. But my observation was that Warren knows himself pretty well. He’s intentionally arranged his life so that things center around him. He’s got his own means of reciprocating and being loyal to people, yet at the same time is not the least ashamed to say that he feels needier than others.

He’s so open about his self-orientation that it’s quite disarming, even part of his charm. He seeks out people who are comfortable with one-sided relationships, and once said that he felt he served Susie and Astrid by being a “taker,” because they loved to “give.” I thought that was pretty astute of him. He’s got a knack of making codependency work for the people involved, which is why people love him even after they get hurt.

JM: Buffett is known as a guy who “tap-dances to work,” and is so comfortable in his rational approach to the market that he could turn things off and nap whenever he needed to. When did he start taking sleeping pills?

AS: Warren is not a big self-medicator, unless you count work, sugar and caffeine. He loves going to work. It really is the highlight of his day. Work is his stress-reliever. He told me he’s never been a great sleeper, and I’m sure that’s true. He goes through withdrawal from work, and he can’t play bridge in his sleep. He’s got a major case of monkey mind, as the Buddhists would say.

My recollection is that he first started using Ambien for jet lag. If he uses it for insomnia, who cares? He’s certainly no Michael Jackson. Probably at least half the people reading this take Ambien or something similar from time to time.

JM: True. Of course, Buffett is, we know, astonishingly intelligent—and not just about investments. For example, he saved Salomon from extinction; turned around the Buffalo News during a very difficult time; and gave excellent advice to Kay Graham—as you write in your book—that helped her save the Washington Post during a crisis early in her tenure running that company.

So how does he sit on the board of Coke while its CEO starts promising growth targets—which Buffett hates—that leads to channel-stuffing and an SEC investigation?

Does he really hate confrontation that much? Or can he simply rationalize his way out of anything?

AS: Warren is pretty good at rationalizing what he needs to if there is money to be made, and he really does hate confrontation. This is mostly about something else, though. You will notice a seeming passivity when he sits on a board that is similar to his reluctance to direct his own managers. (This trait is almost always taken at face value as being one of his strengths, by the way, rather than being studied for the lessons it yields as both a strength and a weakness. But I digress.)

Warren divides the world into matters for which he has assumed personal responsibility and everything else that is not about him. Where he’s taken responsibility and will be judged for it, he’s uncompromising with himself, and even a micromanager. Otherwise, he “abdicates,” to use Tom Murphy’s term.


With both the operating managers and the CEOs of the companies who’s boards he’s sat on, the point at which he takes action is when the damage done by others could reflect on his reputation. The best example is Coca-Cola. He was passive until the crisis, then took on a role so active it shocked people.


JM: Understood. In the paperback “Snowball,” which is updated to cover the financial crisis, you make the excellent point that Buffett's derivatives position handcuffed him during the market collapse last year. But instead of taking sides on whether Buffett should or shouldn’t have sold puts with $37 billion in notional value on the market near the peak, let's invert the question in a manner of speaking, as Charlie Munger likes to do, and look at the sale of puts this way: What does it mean that he did it?

Does it mean that he had become as complacent as everyone else, despite years of warning about “ticking time bombs” and “financial weapons of mass destruction”?

AS: I don’t think he was complacent. Warren views derivatives as being fraught with credit risk. He structured these, and other deals, to protect the company from the capital calls that such risk entails. The decisions he made were excellent in that sense. They are the reason why Berkshire is still standing, financially healthy and why it did not require a bailout.

It’s dicey to second-guess an investor as successful as Warren Buffett. Chances are he will be proved right on those puts and they’ll be profitable. I do think Warren, in his focus on the long-term, missed how much the short-term volatility of the market would affect others’ perceptions of Berkshire’s day-to-day financial strength. Berkshire had an awful lot of market exposure going into the crisis, and unfortunately, during the bloodbath, it didn’t look like the Ft. Knox of capital to the rating agencies.


JM: Okay. And last but not least—you. You describe yourself as “a full-time writer.” What’s next?

AS: I’m working on another book, subject undisclosed except that it’s not a biography. I have been approached to write a biography by several other well-known people, but said no. Right now my interests lie elsewhere.

I’m also writing a column on general topics for Bloomberg, roughly once a month, which has been incredibly enjoyable. Occasionally I’m also writing other short pieces, for example, like this, or for The Motley Fool or Huffington Post. You can find these at my website,
www.aliceschroeder.com.


JM: Excellent, Alice. On behalf of our loyal and thoughtful readers, I thank you very much and wish you good luck.

.
Jeff Matthews
I Am Not Making This Up

© 2009 NotMakingThisUp, LLC

The content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr. Matthews, who also acts as an advisor: clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Matthews’ recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author.

Tuesday, December 01, 2009

The NotMakingThisUp Interview with Alice Schroeder, Author of "The Snowball: Warren Buffett and the Business of Life"

Coming soon to these virtual pages.

JM

Friday, November 27, 2009

Finally, A Crisis We Can Enjoy!


“People are panicking: This whole process counters everything that the rulers have been saying and the way it has been communicated before the holidays so no one can get any information is confusing,” said one hedge fund manager.

A conference call on Thursday for bondholders of Nakheel, the Dubai-owned property company at the centre of the storm, collapsed after phone lines were swamped with callers.”
—The Financial Times


The bad news is there’s another crisis. The good news is it’s not ours.

That’s right: after two straight years of erupting crises, starting with the subprime mortgage crisis (remember “What Happens in Subprime Stays in Subprime”? Ah, those were the days…) and moving on through the housing crisis, the auto crisis, the Iraq crisis, the fiscal crisis, the Bernie Madoff crisis, and now the heath care crisis, it’s a positive relief that a crisis has erupted 6,859 miles from the eastern shores of the United States.

In Dubai.

The word thus far is that European bankers may have $40 billion exposure to that debt-fueled, island-building, Las Vegas-on-the-Persian-Gulf, while U.S. banks appear to have almost none at all.

And while at least one idiot hedge fund manager, quoted above, is telling the Financial Times that he is shocked—shocked!—to discover that some form of gambling has been going on under the noses of the “rulers” of what was, until this weekend, the world’s last remaining Great Bubble, readers of this virtual column could not have suffered any such surprise.

Here’s how we wrote about it one year ago this month, on Friday, November 07, 2008:


Dubious about Dubai


In Dubai, Show Goes On for Property
DUBAI -- Housing crisis? Mortgage meltdown? Credit crunch?
After spending a few hours at Cityscape, this Mideast boom-town's annual real-estate trade show, you just might forget about the financial crisis gripping much of the rest of the world.—The Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2008

It seems like only a month ago that real estate speculators in Dubai were patiently explaining why their Real Estate Bubble was different from our Real Estate Bubble.

In fact, it was just a month ago!

On Sunday evening before the show, Nakheel, a Dubai-government-backed property developer, invited guests including the acting couple Catherine Zeta-Jones and Michael Douglas to the pink Atlantis hotel at the tip of its man-made, palm-shaped archipelago.

The occasion was the launch of Nakheel's latest project: a kilometer-tall skyscraper. The $38 billion project is supposed to someday tower above the world's current tallest building, Burj Dubai, itself nearing completion here.

Hey, with a government-backed developer and Catherine Zeta-Jones on board, what could go wrong with a kilometer-tall skyscraper?

"I'm sure most of you are asking why we're launching this, and you'd be mad not to question it," Nakheel's chief executive Chris O'Donnell said. He added, "The project will be built over 10 years, and we'll have many more [economic] cycles before then...the world will be a different place by the time it's built."

"Mad" is, we think, the exact word for O’Donnell's assurances, as reported by the Wall Street Journal, that the speculation in Dubai will survive whatever cycles the world will throw at it.

In fact, O'Donnell's words bring back memories of summer, 2007, when an investment banker stood at a podium in New York City and confidently explained to a group of investors why Bubble-era multiples on peak-cycle EBITDA numbers for deep-cycle, capital intensive businesses like Freescale Semiconductor made sense.

The key, he said with a straight face, was the lack of restrictive covenants on the leveraged loans, which would help Freescale and others survive whatever economic cycles might be thrown their way.

Still, now that the leveraged loans of Freescale and others are going begging, we find that Perini Corp, a builder of mega-casinos among other things, wants to go to Dubai and get in on the game, as management explained on yesterday’s earnings call:

“The current economic climate involving the credit markets has caused some customers delay in certain new project starts, primarily in the hospitality and gaming markets. Some customers have decided to postpone preconstruction activity until financial markets regain their footing and open up credit capacity….

“Overall, we continue to see many opportunities to secure new business in each of our business segments, both domestic and international. Bob will share more details of our prospects in a few minutes, including our strategy to become a significant contractor in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi in the Middle East.

“In Dubai, we have agreements in principle with substantial local and international partners to participate in construction joint ventures which may be awarded within 90 days. These are for large hospitality and mixed-use projects for which we have participated in several design workshops to date….”

Call us cynics, but if we were building “large hospitality and mixed-use projects” in an overbuilt, Bubble-ridden market like Dubai, we’d want the cash up front, in the bank.

—JeffMatthewsIsNotMakingThisUp, November 9, 2008

Just three months after that conference call, in February 2009, Perini management told Wall Street’s Finest that the Dubai projects “are now on hold.”

Good thing, too: everything in Dubai is now on hold.


Jeff Matthews
I Am Not Making This Up


© 2009 NotMakingThisUp, LLC

The content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr. Matthews, who also acts as an advisor: clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Matthews’ recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author.


Monday, November 23, 2009

The New Risk Factor: Expletive Deleted


A new “risk factor” is cropping up in company conference calls: healthcare legislation.

Before the Securities Litigation Reform Act came along in 1995, companies could—and would—be sued for things that influenced their stock prices, even if those things were beyond management’s control.

Nowadays, so long as a company starts off its earnings call or conference appearance with a long-winded disclaimer of “risks and uncertainties”—to the effect that “Anything we say today might turn out wrong”—the company is somewhat safe from tort lawyers with nothing better to do than trolling for companies to drag down like wolf packs.

Usually, the “risks and uncertainties” covered by these disclaimers relate to demand, supply, pricing, margins, currency fluctuations, tax rates, inflation, earthquakes, patents, intellectual property and, of course, litigation from tort lawyers—among much else.

We are here to report that this “much else” now includes a new “risk factor,” healthcare legislation, as management of Dick’s Sporting Goods—a well-run retailer currently suffering at the hands of a retrenched consumer—highlighted on last week’s conference call:

We believe there is much uncertainty around the consumer's attitude towards spending this holiday season, driven in part by the potential impact of healthcare legislation, possible new tax legislation, and the recently-announced 10.2% unemployment rate.

Dick’s management did not elucidate on the legislation coming out of Washington, but David Farr, the CEO of Emerson Electric Company, did, at a presentation on November 11 at an RW Baird Industrial Conference.

In fact, “elucidate” is too sedate a word for what Farr did: in fact, he unloaded.

Now, David Farr is not your normal grumpy CEO. He does not, for example, preside over a market-share-losing, money-losing, possible-NASDAQ-listing-losing enterprise like a certain irascible, finger-wagging, conspiracy-spewing CEO we could think of.

Nor has he done a discreditable job guiding his worldwide, industrial-sensitive enterprise through the financial crisis: indeed, despite a $4 billion sales drop (on a base of $24 billion), Emerson generated near-record cash flows in its just-ended fiscal year.

And since Emerson has its fingers in almost every aspect of the global economy, from chemicals to climate controls, attention ought to be paid.

Thus we thought it noteworthy to pass on Farr’s passionate, but informed, views on the current healthcare legislation and much else coming out of Washington, thanks to the indispensible StreetEvents. (Farr’s words in bold.)


“A Whole Different World”:

[This has been] a very drastic downturn.


And the key issue is how fast is it going to recover? I'll give you some ideas in a second on this. But I don't think it's going to be as fast as people believe. There's a lot of stress in the world today.

As I look at the Company and I look at the last two recessions, I just started my 10th year as CEO and I have had my second recession. It used to be ten-year cycles. We're going to five-year cycles now, it looks like.

And so if I look at the last downturn in '01 and '03, we took a 14% reduction in the headcount. We closed 75 facilities worldwide. We spent about $440 million restructuring, got the Company going and we grew quite rapidly.For five years, underlying growth rate of 8.5%, earnings growth close to 20%, certainly a lot of cash, the returns at an all-time high, close to 22% return on total capital for us at the endpoint. And then the shock came.

I look at this cycle and what's happening to us different than anything we have seen before. The world is definitely changing.

You're going to see a whole different world emerge in my opinion over the next five to 10 years as the mature markets -- the US, Japan and Western Europe which are highly stressed, highly increasing debt levels and basically restricted of what they can do; if you don't have a major play in the emerging markets, you will not see the type of growth that we have been seeing for the last four or five years.


“Definitely Getting Better”:

We are dealing with a very difficult environment. It's not going to change. It's going to get a little bit better. But we are still dealing with a very weak global manufacturing industrial environment, though not as bad as it was two or three months ago as you'll see.


So as I look at that this right now, we're looking at a very challenging year again; not as bad as last year. I mean, down 12% is the worst we have ever seen but it's definitely getting better and you'll start seeing this trend line coming. You will see that our orders will follow that very quickly….


“I’m Not Going to Hire Anybody in the United States”

Now, to tell you how bad this is and tell you what I think Washington is doing right now, Washington is doing everything in their manpower capability to destroy US manufacturers, fundamentally destroy US manufacturers.

Cap and trade, medical reform, labor rules, whatever they want to do, raise taxes. They're just going to destroyed jobs. We have already reached 7.3 million jobs in this downturn. We're going to 8. That is a summation of the last four downturns.

So what do you think the recovery is going to be in jobs? It ain't going to be very good. I listen to everything Washington is doing -- wasting money, raising the deficit to 10, $12 trillion -- the debt level to 10, $12 trillion, going to $23 trillion; raising taxes; putting regulations and requirements on me as a manufacturing company.

What do you think I'm going to do? I'm not going to hire anybody in the United States. I'm moving. So they're doing everything possible to destroy jobs, in my opinion. That's my opinion as a manufacturer and we employ 125,000 people worldwide. So I do know what the (expletive) I'm talking about.

We used to employ a lot more in the United States and we will continue to move [all this]. When I see guys like this, Wall Street bailouts, car bailouts, I'm looking -- what are these guys doing with our money? They're wasting trillions of dollars, trillions of dollars.

So what they are going to do, they're going to pass a new medical healthcare, raise my costs, jobs will go. Cap and trade, tax me, jobs will go. It's pretty straightforward. What they're doing right now ain't working. 8 million jobs, summation of the last four downturns….

“Where the Opportunity Right Now Is”

Why do you think we're moving our companies into the emerging markets? Because that's where the growth is. That's where the jobs are going to be. That's where we can create value. Share of this market is going to get less. It's going to go down to 45%.

So this is where we're making our investments because this is where we are going to grow. This is what is going to happen in the economy. And so if you look at where the opportunity right now is, it's not in Rhode Island. It's not in Connecticut, it's not in Illinois.

It is in India, it's in China. I'm taking another trip to China on Saturday. I go there seven, eight times a year. I go to Latin America, I go to the Middle East. That's where the growth is going to be, international.Since I've been CEO, we've added close to 19 points of emerging market sales. We're up to 33%.....

If you look at the last 10 years…73% of our growth has been in emerging markets. We have invested aggressively.


Where “The Degree of Freedom” Lies:

I lived over there, I ran Asia for a long time, for almost five years. I see the next five years an underlying growth rate of 5 to 7%. We're going to have over 60% of our growth in emerging markets, maybe 70% again.

The trend lines are there. Mature market growth will be a lot less just because the economics and the degree of freedom and the overcapacity issues we face in these countries.

So we as a Company today are putting our best people, our best technology and our best investments in these marketplaces to grow. Because my job is to grow that top line, grow my earnings, grow my cash flow and grow my returns to the shareholders.

My job is not to shrink and roll over for the US government. That is not my job. That's not what I get paid to do.

“Expletive Deleted”

You talk about in renewable and alternative, we have $50 million this year. We're going to go to over $800 million in five years. We created wind converters for China. We have pitch controls, electronic controls for the windmills.

At the bottom, we have solar products, both the systems and power conversion. So we have created a whole portfolio of products for this. But you're not going to see Emerson going out there with fancy commercials or sitting at the right hand of some president talking about this (expletive). We do it. We (expletive) do it (expletive).

I don't need to be told, I don't need to get government handouts, I can do it without them.


Before dismissing Farr as somewhat unhinged, recall that he employs 125,000 human beings and knows a thing or two about global competition—having lived in Asia himself, and more than doubling his company’s international business in ten years.

Also, companies do not call out items as “risk factors” just for the heck of it: clearly Dick's Sporting Goods sees a potential problem looming with its own customers.

And by way of coda, we’ll share a quote on the subject of healthcare reform from the calm, deliberate CEO of a small US-based company that manufacturers nearly all its product in China.

When asked if the recent drop in the US Dollar would hurt his price advantage versus US-sourced competitors, the CEO noted that, for one thing, dollar-priced raw materials consumed in China are paid for in a strong currency, keeping his cost of goods lower than for a US producer importing the same raw materials.

And for another thing, he added matter-of-factly, “When this healthcare bill passes, nobody’s going to want to manufacture in the U.S. anyway.”

Expletive deleted, indeed.



Jeff Matthews
I Am Not Making This Up



© 2009 NotMakingThisUp, LLC

The content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr. Matthews, who also acts as an advisor: clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Matthews’ recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author.

Friday, November 20, 2009

Shoot the Messenger! Or at Least Get the SEC to Investigate Him!


“When all else fails we can whip the horses’ eyes,
And make them sleep
And cry.”

—“The Soft Parade,” The Doors


Okay so we’re not exactly sure what Jim Morrison’s “Soft Parade” lyrics have to do with the central message of today’s virtual column—except that the dead poet’s gloomy words came immediately to mind while reading what we here at NotMakingThisUp believe is the single most important story in today’s Wall Street Journal.

The story is titled “A Tough ‘Sell’ for Jefferies Analyst,” and reporter David Armstrong starts it off thusly:

Jefferies & Co. analyst Brian Kennedy made the best call of his fledgling career when he slapped a ‘sell’ rating on shares of CardioNet Inc. earlier this year.

Then he quit his job
.

Our sharp-eyed, long-time readers will know precisely where this story is going before it gets there.


But to spell it out for any less-than-sharp-eyed readers out there—i.e. Congresspersons, especially those on Important Financial Sub-Committees—the story of Brian Kennedy and CardioNet is the story of every Wall Street analyst who didn’t go along with the crowd in recommending a company otherwise universally touted by Wall Street’s Finest.

Kennedy was snubbed within his own firm and investigated by its own attorneys, and he was blacklisted by CardioNet management, who decried him as a tool of short-sellers and filed a complaint against him with the SEC.

That he was right in the end—CardioNet blew up for exactly the reason he put a “Sell” on the stock to begin with—didn’t help Brian Kennedy at all.

Thus the story of CardioNet is the story of Citigroup and Fannie Mae and WorldCom and Enron and every other bad investment idea whose cheer-leaders steamrolled whoever tried to raise a factual dissent of “The Story.”

As such, it ought to be required reading in every research department where Wall Street’s Finest practice their craft, not to mention in the hearing committee rooms of Congress, where short-sellers—rather than bad lending, bad borrowing, bad management and bad regulators—are routinely trotted out as “Exhibit A” in the Causes of the Financial Crisis.

Having recently visited the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame and Museum in Cleveland—which has, among its many mind-numbingly detailed displays, a fascinating collection of childhood memorabilia of a surprisingly innocent Jim Morrison, including a grade-school report card and a polite thank-you note written to his mother years before he became a fall-down drunk—Morrison’s dark exhortation at the end of “The Soft Parade” simply seems to fit the mood of the Journal’s article

“When all else fails we can whip the horses’ eyes,” indeed.


But so as not to end on a down beat, we are happy to report that, when asked to name the nicest guy she’d met at the Rock and Roll Museum thus far, the grey-pony-tailed ticket-taker said “Alice Cooper” without missing a beat.

One day, as promised, we will tell the story of How Jed Drake and I Stole Alice Cooper’s Mailbox.



Jeff Matthews
I Am Not Making This Up

© 2009 NotMakingThisUp, LLC

The content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr. Matthews, who also acts as an advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Matthews’ recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author.

Tuesday, November 17, 2009

REALLY Grumpy Analyst Syndrome


In “Grumpy Analyst Syndrome, or, ‘Optimistic, How Dare He!’” from August 31, we noted the uncanny tendency of Wall Street’s Finest—of which we were one, once—to throw in the towel on their favorite stocks at precisely the end of whatever bear market has caused those stocks to collapse.

This makes WSF look doubly-dumb: first for stubbornly keeping “Buy” ratings on stocks that collapse, and then for stubbornly keeping “Sell” ratings on those same stocks as they begin to recover.

As we pointed out, Grumpy Analysts often take out their ensuing frustrations on earnings conference calls—sometimes in the manner of radio call-in conspiracy theorists who seek to dump As Much Vital Important Information As Possible on their hosts Before Government Agents Pull The Plug.

By way of example, we quoted from the Toll Brothers earnings call that triggered our initial musings on Grumpy Analyst Syndrome, when one such GA actually warned CEO Bob Toll of “ominous statistics” that he would be wise to keep an eye on:

Well, just to keep in mind, Bob, keep in mind before you go there, these are foreclosures in process so they're not yet hitting the real estate for sale side market, so they are ominous statistics and I think that we have seen false recoveries before…

When the CEO attempted to point out that his company had seen a recovery in housing demand despite the rise in foreclosures, the GA, rather than being mollified, continued to wag a finger with this warning about Toll’s fourth quarter results:

I guess what I'm just trying to point out and make sure that Toll Brothers is thinking about as well is the headwind that might be fourth quarter 2009…

That was in August, and apparently the world has not taken heed of such “headwinds,” for when Toll Brothers reported its fiscal fourth quarter 2009 results last week, orders were up 42% in units and 62% in dollars from the year before.

This good news was, apparently, too much for our Grumpy Analyst, who did not bother to ask questions on the ensuing conference call.

Instead, the GA spoke truth to power by appealing directly to the New York Times, in a Sunday column by the redoubtable Gretchen Morgenson, called “Home Builders (You Heard That Right) Get a Gift.”

Morgenson's column concerned the latest Tax Break for Businesses that Don’t Need Tax Breaks: a $33 billion gift to, among others, homebuilders.

And in it, Morgenson makes the plain point that providing more government assistance to companies that contributed to the housing bubble at the center of the crisis in the first place makes no great amount of sense—especially since it merely encourages the same mindless growth-for-growth’s sake that caused the problem we’re now coming out of.

Besides, as she rightly points out, having come through the down-cycle relatively intact, homebuilders don’t exactly need more dough.

Still, you might wonder why one of Wall Street’s Finest would bother commenting in that article, since government policy isn’t exactly what Wall Street’s Finest are paid to evaluate.

Investors live in a world as it is—not as they wish it to be. If the government decides to throw more money at one particular interest group, well, so be it.

But not to our Grumpy Analyst, who sniffed to Morgenson as follows:

“I AM surprised that home builders are getting hundreds of millions of dollars given that many have very strong balance sheets,” said Ivy Zelman, chief executive at Zelman & Associates, a research firm. “We question the public policy decision to gift home builders with capital that many will not use to create jobs, since they admit that job growth will be dependent not on capital, but on improving demand.”

Hence do Grumpy Analysts become Really Grumpy Analysts.

And stocks do what they will.




Jeff Matthews
I Am Not Making This Up


© 2009 NotMakingThisUp, LLC

The content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr. Matthews.
Mr. Matthews also acts as an advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Matthews’ recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author.

Tuesday, November 10, 2009

Why Buffett Finished Off Burlington: It’s the Inventories, Stupid


Well, what the heck: why not use a great line, slightly altered, to make a point?

The point being that what Pink Floyd once called “what the fighting’s all about” (at least as far as capital markets go) is not, strictly speaking, the economy.

Sure, everybody has an opinion on whether we’re going to have a V-shaped, U-shaped, W-shaped or L-shaped recovery (what happens in China: do they have sinographic recoveries?).

Even my dog Charles has an opinion: he thinks it’s going to be shaped like his giant plastic red dog bone.

But the issue that will determine the near-term course of the economy is simple enough, and has nothing to do with letters or ideographs or even giant red dog bones: it’s the inventories, stupid.

And inventories are probably as low as they are ever going to go.

Here’s how the CFO of 3M put it on their October 22 earnings call:

Heading into 2009, in the face of such a significant economic collapse, we set very aggressive cash flow targets for each of our businesses. Ground leaders and their teams have responded with great results. Third quarter free cash flow is $1.6 billion, up $769 million versus last year's third quarter. This represents a 97% year-on-year increase. The improvement was driven by many factors, but most notably by lower capital expenditures, improving that working capital, lower cash tax payments and also reduced cash pension contributions. Net working capital declined by $415 million year-on-year, with inventory down $443 million....

Lest anyone think we cherry-picked a particular industrial conglomerate in the form of the famous Post-It notes maker, we did not. Pick any company in the same SIC code as 3M and you ’ll hear pretty much the exact same story.

And it is not just old-line conglomerates that have brought inventories down to can’t-go-lower levels.

Bob Wachob, the CEO of Rogers Corporation, which makes, to be technical about it, stuff that goes into cellphones, told listeners last week that his company’s hi-tech customers have not much in the way of surplus inventory:

Our customers are continuing to order with a request for extremely short lead times. That is a good indication they don't have any inventory.

As for Rogers’ own inventories, Wachob said, without mincing words:

I think we are as low as we can go without impacting our customers.

Even a homebuilder as bruised and battered as Beazer has begun running low in inventory at the very moment orders are increasing, as reported earlier today:

As of September 30, we had only 270 unsold finished homes and 417 unsold homes under construction representing declines of 34% and 27% respectively from year-ago levels. With a cautiously optimistic outlook, we do not contemplate further significant reductions in our unsold home inventory levels but rather the resumption of more normal seasonal patterns.

Net new home orders of 1012 for the quarter represented an increase of 2.4% year-over-year.


Most striking of all, however—just as far as being emphatic about it goes—was Jeff Siegel, the CEO of Lifetime Brands, a kitchenware maker that sells to the Bed, Bath and Beyonds of the world, when he was asked by one of Wall Street’s Finest to size up the inventory reduction at that firm’s major customers:

It's shocking. Honestly, it's sometimes a shocking number. And I don't -- I can't get at the numbers by retailer, but we do get it from -- like one retailer we're down about 6% on point of sale at one retailer. Our inventories are down over 30%.

In other words, while sales of Lifetime’s products at this unnamed retailer are running 6% below last year, inventories of those same products at that same retailer are down by one-third.

The response to Siegel’s comment from the member of Wall Street’s Finest who asked the provocative question?

“Wow.”

Wow indeed.

So what happens when somebody actually needs to order a pallet of new flexible circuits for a rush order of cell phones, or an extra gross of Post-It notes not available on the loading dock, or a set of kitchen knives not sitting in the warehouse…or, heaven forbid, a whole new house?

Now, we’re well aware that Warren Buffett doesn’t make short-term bets on markets or economies.

But given the fact that he stands at the center of an economic supply chain that stretches from a candy maker in South San Francisco to a high-tech machine tooling supplier in Israel, we think it’s no wonder Warren Buffett decided the time was right to buy the rest of Burlington Northern.

There’s going to be a lot of—to be technical again—stuff that will need to be getting moved around in the next twelve months.

It’s the inventories, and Buffett isn’t stupid.



Jeff Matthews
I Am Not Making This Up



© 2009 NotMakingThisUp, LLC

The content contained in this blog represents only the opinions of Mr. Matthews.
Mr. Matthews also acts as an advisor and clients advised by Mr. Matthews may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Matthews’ recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Matthews: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the author.